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Pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(c) and 26(a), Appellant Kilgore 
Pavement Maintenance, LLC ("KPM"), by and through its undersigned counsel Strong & 
Hanni law firm, submits this brief in reply to the Brief of Appellee filed by Appellee City 
of West Jordan ("Brief of Appellee" or "Opposition Brief). 
ARGUMENT 
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriately granted only if it appears 
the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under the facts alleged or under any state of 
facts the plaintiff could prove to support its claim. Mackey v. Cannon, 996 P.2d 1081, 
1084 (Utah App. 2000). When reviewing whether a district court has properly granted a 
motion to dismiss under Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the appellate court must accept all 
factual allegations in the complaint as true and consider them and all reasonable 
inferences to be drawn from them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Canyon 
Meadows Home Owners Assn. v. Wasatch County, 40P.3d 1148, 1151 (Utah App. 2001). 
Contrary to this standard, West Jordan infuses its Opposition Brief with statements 
of alleged fact not contained in the pleadings and not found in the record. Brief of 
Appellee at 6-7, Appendices A, B, and C. Ostensibly, this stratagem is meant to create 
questions of fact regarding the high price and volatility of oil from 2006 and 2008 and 
whether, in fact, this was generally known by KPM at the time of contracting. Id. at 7, 
22-24. Of course, these are questions of fact not considered by the district court and, 
consequently, are not the subject of this Court's review. See Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b) ("If, 
on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented 
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to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary 
judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56"). 
Suffice it to say, KPM entered into a contract with West Jordan to provide asphalt 
related services that is attached to the Complaint (the "Contract"). R. 2, 28-30, 34-73. 
KPM alleges that a subsequent 300% price escalation of liquid asphalt oil (the raw 
material required to perform the Contract) was materially excessive, abrupt (occurring 
within a period of weeks), and unforeseen, thereby causing KPM to suffer an excessive 
and unreasonable cost increase, and rendering KPM's performance on the "Contract 
Price"1 impracticable. R. 2-4 {Complaint at fflf 9-11, 18-21). 
Accepting these allegations as true, therefore, the issues before the Court are 
relatively straightforward. Under the terms of the Contract and the common law rule 
adopted by Utah, did KPM expressly assume the risk of a commercial impracticability 
brought about by the extraordinary and unforeseen escalation of the cost of liquid asphalt 
oil? R. 242 {Minute Entry ruling that "one who assumes the risk of cost increases 
pursuant to contract terms cannot rely on a claim of impossibility/commercial 
impracticability"). Or, as pleaded by KPM, was the risk of impracticability not bargained 
for in the Contract?2 R. 4 {Complaint at ^ 19). 
1
 Defined in the Contract at Art. I, "Definitions." R. 35. 
2
 KPM divides this question into two specific issues for appeal: (1) Did the district court 
err in determining that KPM assumed the risk of an unforeseen and extraordinary 
increase in the cost of liquid asphalt oil pursuant to the parties' contract? (2) Did the 
district court err in dismissing KPM's first cause of action because of its determination 
that "a party who assumes the risk of cost increases pursuant to contract terms cannot rely 
on a claim of impossibility/commercial impracticability? Docketing Statement at 2-4. 
S 
Setting aside the above purported questions of fact, West Jordan responds to this 
query with two principal arguments. First, West Jordan asserts that under the terms of 
the Contract KPM "agreed to accept the Contract Price as full payment for its 
performance" and "expressly assumed the risk of increases in costs of materials," 
including the unforeseen escalation in price of liquid asphalt oil. Brief of Appellee at 8-9, 
19-22. And second, West Jordan argues that KPM cannot invoke the doctrine of 
impracticability as a "sword" to rewrite the terms of a "fixed-price" Contract.3 Brief of 
Appellee at 5-6, 12-14. 
With respect to the former argument, the terms of the Contract and the common 
law rule of impracticability adopted by Utah do not foreclose KPM's claim. Although a 
party may "agree to perform in spite of impracticability," in the absence of express 
language, the potential foreseeability of a particular event does not necessarily imply the 
assumption of this "greater obligation." See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 261 
(1981) cmt. c. In this case, West Jordan argues, and the district court apparently 
concurred, that KPM contractually assumed all risks associated with the costs of 
materials, including those risks that would normally excuse KPM's performance under 
the doctrine of impracticability; regardless of any unforeseen increase in cost, no matter 
how abrupt, and no matter how extraordinary or excessive. See R. 242-43 (Minute 
Entry). However, the "four comers" of the Contract do not contain an absolute ceiling on 
The former presents a question of contract interpretation; the latter, a question regarding 
application of the rule of impracticability. Id 
3
 In its previously denied motion for summary disposition, West Jordan phrased this 
argument as KPM attempting to "rewrite" the terms of the Contract. Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Summary Disposition at 6-7. 
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the "Contract Price" or "Cost of Work" to West Jordan (EL 35)—as distinguished from 
the "Work" (R. 37)—nor does the Contract include any other written provision which 
conclusively evinces the parties' intent to allocate the risk of impracticability solely to 
KPM. Before the district court dismissed KPM's claim, it should have considered facts 
relating to the relative increase in cost to KPM and the attending circumstances of the 
parties (for example, the bargaining power of the City and the inability of KPM to 
negotiate an asphalt price escalation clause)4 and determined whether the impracticability 
was actually foreseen and exclusively assumed by KPM. Western Prop. v. Southern 
Utah Aviation, Inc., 116 P.2d 656, 659 n. 5 (Utah App. 1989) (noting that the "critical 
fact" is "whether the parties actually did foresee [the event] and provide accordingly in 
their contract" (emphasis in original text)); see Raytheon Co. v. Sec. of the Army, 305 
F.3d 1354, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("Whether performance of a particular contract would 
be commercially senseless is a question of fact."). 
Regarding West Jordan's latter argument, KPM is not requesting the Court 
"rewrite" a fixed-price contract, nor is it seeking an untenable form of relief. Brief of 
Appellee at 5-6, 12. In addition to "Work covered by [a City-approved] Change Order," 
Section 11.1(c) of the Contract provides a specific formula for determining "[t]he value 
4
 West Jordan argues that the inability to negotiate a price escalation clause in the 
Contract necessarily implies that KPM knew of and assumed the risk of impracticability. 
Brief of Appellee at 9 and 21. This is a fact question determined by the circumstances of 
the parties and should not be inferred against KPM on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 261, cmt. c (stating that "[circumstances relevant in 
deciding whether a party has assumed a greater obligation include his ability to have 
inserted a provision in the contract expressly shifting the risk of impracticability to the 
other party"). 
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of. . . any claim for an increase or decrease in the Contract Price" that would include 
KPM's claim. R. 51. The rule of impracticability in conjunction with this term provides 
KPM an appropriate cause of action to adjust the Contract Price and compensate for the 
extraordinary and unforeseen change of circumstances imposed on KPM. 
KPM respectfully requests the Court reject each of West Jordan's arguments and 
reinstate its impracticability claim in the district court. 
I. The terms of the Contract do not foreclose KPM's impracticability claim. 
As discussed in KPM's principal brief, the primary factor for a determination of 
impracticability is actual foreseeability. Western Prop., 776 P.2d at 659 n. 5. Because 
the rule is also based on the principle of assent, "the critical fact is not whether the event 
could have been foreseen, but rather, whether the parties actually did foresee it and 
provide accordingly in their contract." Id. (emphasis in original text); see also Corbin on 
Contracts § 74.15 (stating that unless an assumption of risk is "explicitly allocated to a 
party," whether such an allocation was contemplated more often requires "looking at the 
entire contract and other circumstances affecting the agreement"). 
In this case, West Jordan argues the district court properly determined that 
commercial impracticability, caused by an abrupt 300% increase in the cost of liquid 
asphalt oil, well beyond the normal range, was—notwithstanding the pleadings— 
foreseen by the parties and exclusively assumed by KPM under the Contract. Brief of 
Appellee at 11, 19-22; R. 242 {Minute Entry). West Jordan's Opposition Brief argues 
that Sections 6.2(d), 9.9(c), and 11.1(a) of the Contract each memorializes this supposed 
agreement of KPM to perform in spite of impracticability. Id. at 9, 21 (arguing that these 
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particular Sections show KPM "expressly assumed the risk of increases in the cost of 
materials"). However, only Section 11.1(a) speaks of cost and the "Contract Price." R. 
51. The "responsibilities" assumed by KPM for the "Work" under Sections 6.2(d) and 
9.9(c) relate to indemnification of the City under Section 6.11, KPM's means and 
methods of construction under Section 9(c) and (d), warranty under Section 13.1, and the 
like. R. 44, 46-47, 50, and 56. Significantly, the "Work" of KPM referenced in Sections 
6.2(d) and 9.9(c), and relied upon by West Jordan to argue assumption of risk, is 
distinguished from the "Cost of Work" defined in Article I. R. 35 and 37. 
Regarding Contract Price, Section 11.1(a) states that "[t]he Contract Price 
constitutes the total compensation (subject to City-authorized adjustments [under Section 
11.1(b)])" payable to KPM and that "[a]ll duties, responsibilities, and obligations 
assigned to or undertaken by [KPM] shall be at its expense without change in the 
Contract Price." R. 51. But, importantly, Section 11.1(c) of the Contract also provides a 
formula for changing the Contract Price outside of City-approved Change Orders. Id. 
(stating that "[t]he value of any Work covered by a Change Order or Work Directive 
Change or of any claim for an increase or decrease in the Contract Price shall be 
determined in one of the following ways . . .") (emphasis added)). Of course, if only 
City-authorized Change Orders could increase the Contract Price, there would be no need 
for the additional language of Section 11.1(c) for any other "claim."5 See Jones v. ERA 
5
 West Jordan argues that KPM misunderstands Section 11.1(c), which it asserts "merely 
describes how a City-authorized adjustment is to be valued." Brief of Appellee at 22. 
This only begs the question posited by KPM. If "[t]he Contract Price may only be 
changed by a City-approved Change Order" as defined in Section 11.1(b) (R. 51 
o 
Brokers Consol, 6 P.3d 1129, 1131 (Utah 2000) (stating that contract provisions should 
be interpreted by a court "in relation to all of the others, with a view toward giving effect 
to all and ignoring none. 
Under the common law rule of commercial impracticability, as adopted by Utah, 
KPM has such a claim to increase the Contract Price according to Section 11.1(c) 
because the Contract does not explicitly allocate to KPM the risk of an unexpected 300% 
rise in cost of liquid asphalt oil. The district court erroneously concluded that KPM 
contracted for this risk without considering the degree of difficulty to KPM and whether 
the unforeseen increase was "well beyond the normal range" of contract expectation. See 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 261, cmt. c and d; see also Aluminum Co. of Am. v. 
Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 73 (W.D. Pa. 1980) (holding that "[t]he increase in 
cost of performance [was] sever enough" in relation to the contract price, specifically, a 
574.2% increase in costs, to warrant relief under the doctrine of impracticability). In 
deciding West Jordan's Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the district court should have 
considered these fact questions in favor of KPM and not ruled that an assumption of risk 
of normal cost increases necessarily forecloses any claim of impracticability. R. 242-43 
{Minute Entry). 
(emphasis added)), then an adjustment to the Contract Price "for any claim" other than a 
Change Order becomes meaningless. 
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II. KPM does not improperly invoke the doctrine of impracticability as a 
"sword" to "rewrite" the Contract. 
Contrary to West Jordan's averment, KPM's affirmative claim is not contrary to 
the common law doctrine of impracticability and does not seek to "rewrite" the Contract. 
Brief of Appellee at 13-14, 18-19. 
First, West Jordan cites no authority proscribing the use of impracticability as an 
affirmative claim for damages. Although commonly asserted as a justification for lack of 
performance, "[ljike the common law in general, the impossibility doctrine is sufficiently 
flexible and adaptive to achieve just results dependent on the factual circumstances 
presented to the court." Corbin on Contracts § 74.15. Impracticability is not prescribed 
solely as a defense. Significantly, West Jordan does not argue against the general 
proposition that impracticability can be "treated as a type of constructive change to the 
contract," thus entitling a contractor to equitable adjustment. Raytheon, 305 F.3d at 
1367. And it does not argue that lack of a specific clause in a given agreement precludes 
equitable adjustment. See M.J. Paquet, Inc. v. N.J. Dept. ofTransp., 19A A.2d 141, 149-
50 (NJ. 2002). In this case, the impracticability caused by the rise in cost of liquid 
asphalt should be treated as a type of constructive change—i.e. modification—of the 
Contract, thus allowing for an adjustment of the Contract Price consistent with Section 
11.1(c).6 
6
 West Jordan misunderstands the purpose for KPM citing these two cases. Brief of 
Appellee at 14-16. The issue is not whether the City modified the Contract, but whether 
the doctrine of impracticability, as articulated by Raytheon, supra, would allow for the 
drastic rise in cost to KPM to be treated as a constructive change. If so, then KPM would 
be entitled to an "equitable adjustment" of the Contract Price, notwithstanding the 
11 
Second, as discussed above, Section 11.1(c) provides a formula for increases in 
the Contract Price according to Sections 11.2 and 11.4. R. 52-55. These provisions 
provide for "the value of Work" to be determined by the "Cost of Work," specifically, 
"the sum of all costs necessarily incurred and paid by the Contractor [KPM] for labor, 
materials, and equipment, plus Contractor's overhead, and profit in the proper 
performance of the work." R. 51 (Sections 11.1(c) and 11.2(a)). Sections 11.2(c) and 
11.4 further include terms that define these amounts. R. 52, 54-55. The formula to 
determine the increase in Contract Price for KPM's commercial impracticability claim is 
set by the Contract and there is no need to rewrite its terms. KPM's claim merely 
compels West Jordan to compensate KPM according to the change it requested and 
which the City should have approved. R. 3 {Complaint at ^ f 12-15). 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, and those set forth in its principal brief, KPM respectfully 
requests the Court reject West Jordan's arguments and reinstate its impracticability claim 
in the district court. 
absence of a price escalation or similar clause, because the language of Section 11.1(c) 
plausibly permits the same. Cf MJ. Paquet, 794 A.2d at 153-54 (finding the relevant 
contract provision ambiguous, plausibly allowing for the adjustment, and identifying 
other independent equitable grounds to justify the claim). 
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